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Environmentalism, Postmaterialism, and Anxiety: 
The New Politics of Individualism
Summary
The new social movements, and environmentalism among them, were explained as forms o f  
"new politics", rising from the spread o f  postmaterialist values and lifestyles among the new 
middle classes. Yet, an analysis o f empirical data and findings shows that Postmaterialism 
and the "new politics" hardly explain the whole o f  environmentalism. Bursts o f  local grass­
roots mobilization, coupled with defensive attitudes represent a sort o f  forgotten face o f it, 
coming close to, and sometimes intertwining with, the new wave o f  populist protest. Can 
these two faces o f  environmentalism be explained by common phenomena o f  structural and 
cultural transformation? This essay argues that they can be explained by the transformation 
o f  the grammar o f  life-forms that has been described by post modernist theory. It is argued 
that it is precisely consumption, and the social dynamics it gives rise to, that can explain the 
two sides o f  environmentalism. While the post-materialist side represents the progressive 
approach o f a new individualized consumerist politics, the populist side can be seen as the 
defensive attitude arising from declassification and the destruction o f  meaning and o f 
community forms. Together, these two sides come to constitute a major challenge to current 
political institutions which is not that which focuses on environmental problems, but that 
which develops around the constitution o f social forms as a collective good (and which is 
represented metaphorically by environmental problems).
1. Environmentalism, postmaterialist values and the New Middle Class
Modern environmentalism started to become visible at the end of the 1960s. The 
actors that have carried it into the political arena - the environmentalist 
movement and the various sorts of "green party" - have been recognised as a 
central component of the so-called "New Politics". The term "New Politics" is 
used to refer "to the growing importance of a new set of political goals" 
(Poguntke 1993: 10) and to a broad new challenge to the functioning of Western 
political institutions, coming from non-institutional actors.
The challenge comes from individuals and new social groups 



























































































diverse and citizen-oriented set of interests (Dalton, Kuechler and 
Buerklin 1990:3)
Besides the environment, pollution and nuclear energy, its priorities have been 
those of peace, human and women's rights.
Most students have seen the "New Politics" phenomenon as having its roots in 
the students' movement and in the alternative political culture of the New Left 
(Touraine 1980; Melucci 1984; Kitschelt 1985; Dalton 1988; Jamison et al. 
1990; Mueller-Rommel 1990; Dalton, Kuechler and Buerklin 1990). On the one 
side, these students have pointed out the difference between the New Politics' 
actors and the traditional Left in terms of ideology and goals, and of participants' 
class location, as well as political experience. The New Politics is said to be 
different from the "Old" Politics with its "preoccupation with economic growth, 
stable prices, a stable economy, strong military defence and conventional 
political style" (Poguntke 1993: 10) as well as its concern with material wealth 
and its distribution among the social classes (Inglehart 1977; 1990b; Dalton 
1988; Dalton and Kuechler 1990). Modem environmentalism is said to question 
the emphasis on wealth, material well-being and consumption as derivatives of 
the idea of technology as a measure of human civilization (Dunlap and van Liere, 
1978; Melucci 1984; Milbrath, 1984). Its concerns are "the concerns that a post­
industrial society might emphasize" (Baker el al. 1981:141). Of course, it is new 
class strata which excludes the working class, while including broad segments of 
the middle classes and some marginal "non-professional" strata like students and 
housewives (Cotgrove and Duff 1980; Melucci 1984; Offe 1985a), and a new 
breed of movement activists (Diani 1995) that are the carriers of these struggles.
On the other side, however, the same students have seen the anti­
establishment and anti-industrial attitudes as still clearly associated to a 
democratic-libertarian culture. The New Politics is seen as challenging the 
traditional working class Left mostly because of its institutionalized politics and 



























































































parties like the green parties are seen as straggling in favour of direct 
participation and the openness of political institutions, stressing the key of 
individual self-realization and self-determination (Poguntke 1989). In short, the 
New Politics, and the environmentalist movement alike, have been broadly seen 
as rooted in a straggle in favour of progressive values and of a more democratic 
society. They are seen as a heritage of the "Left-libertarian tradition" (Kitschelt 
1985): as attempts at opening new spaces for civil society's political democratic 
participation by freeing politics from the professionalization of incumbent 
politicians and established bureaucratic institutions (Jamison et al. 1990:192).'
Perhaps the most influential explanation of the New Politics, as Dalton, 
Kuechler and Buerklin ( 1990) say, is that which comes from of Inglehart's work 
(Inglehart 1977; 1990a). According to Inglehart, in Western countries the long 
post-war period of peace and economic growth allowed the satisfaction of basic 
material and security needs among larger and larger strata of the population. The 
experience of increased material well-being produced, in younger cohorts who 
had not lived through the hardship of war, "An intergenerational shift from 
material to postmaterial values" (Inglehart 1990a: 103). These cohorts are said to 
value participation, self-actualization, and aesthetical needs, and to abandon 
material wealth as the highest priority.1 2 Postmaterialism is then linked to a
1 In terms of political coalitions, while it is true that the new environmentalism has proved 
difficult to absorb by the traditional left, it is also true that individual participants’ and green 
groups and parties' have often shown a clear preference for the leftist side of the political 
spectrum. In several cases (eg., in France, in German Landers, in Italian local governments) 
green parties have joined coalitions with traditional left (socialist or socialdemocratic) parties. 
Moreover, several analyses (Inglehart 1990b; Rohrschneider 1991) have shown 
environmentalist participants' identification with the leftist side or with issues that lie within 
the leftist tradition (if only, as Inglehart says, because the Left "constitutes the side of the 
political spectrum that is seeking social change”; 1990b:46). This indentification however is 
also variable across countries (Mueller-Rommel 1990; Rohrschneider 1991).
2 Inglehart says: "it is not that the postmaterialists reject the fruits of prosperity - but simply 
that their value priorities are less strongly dominated by the imperatives that were central to 




























































































decline of economic and class-based issues, and to an increased salience of life­
style issues, which are "transversal" to "old" class-based cleavages.
A second - but less popular - explanation has been formulated especially by 
New Social Movements (NSM) theorists (Touraine 1980; Brand 1982; Melucci 
1984; OfFe 1985a). Drawing on the theorists of the "post-industrial society", and 
of the rise of the new "professional-managerial class" (Touraine 1969; Bell 
1973; Gouldner 1979; Ehrenreich and Ehrenreich 1979), European NSM 
theorists stress the finding that "New Movements" activists and participants are 
especially likely to be drawn from new professional strata typical of the post­
industrial stage, and endowed with a high level of education and intellectual 
skills: A "New Middle Class" or "human capital class" (Melucci 1989) 
composed of individuals who, although not in the power position of the 
American "New Class", are active as professionals in the field of cultural 
reproduction or in the expanding public and service sectors (teachers, civil 
servants, medical personnel, etc.; Melucci 1984; Offe 1985a). Because of their 
education, professional socialization and lifestyle, NMC members are assumed 
to be interested in decentralization, participation, political openness and a 
general democratization of social and political life.
In its implications, the NMC model overlaps substantially with that of the 
"culture shift", and lends support to the view of the New Politics as based on a 
quest for openness, participation, responsiveness, and democratization through 
new issues that are ill-aligned to traditional party cleavages.
2. Environmentalism as a quest for democracy?
It is my contention that the left-libertarian, democratising component of modem 
environmentalism (as well as of the New Politics) has received an almost 




























































































political meaning (as well as political consequences) of the rise of these 
phenomena.
In the first place, convincing as they may be, current models seem to offer 
only a partial explanation for the new environmentalism. They point to social and 
cultural transformations, but there is nothing that links the content of 
environmental demands to the structural nature of the above transformations. 
The main shortcoming of these analyses is that they are based on individual-level 
factors, such as the level of education, the experience of security, etc. 
"Structural" factors are considered only as socio-demographics (eg., the rise of 
white collars), overlooking the mechanisms through which social structure 
reproduces itself.
More specifically, because of the way Inglehart's definition of 
"Postmaterialism" is constructed,3 his analysis, and the others which refer to it 
(Cotgrove and Duff 1980; 1981; Savage 1985; Mueller-Rommel 1990; 
Rohrschneider 1990; 1991), emphasize the fact that "Postmaterialism" is linked 
with the involvement in movement mobilization, as well as with the quest for 
direct participation and political openness. But the models fail to deal with the 
question of the novelties in the substantive content of the postmaterialist 
demands.4 As such, this "Postmaterialism" may just tap a phenomenon where
3 See Kuechler and Dalton (1990) for a criticism in this direction The "postmaterialist" items 
are "Give people more say in important political decisions", and "Protect freedom of speech 
and thought". They are counterposed to "materialist" items: "Maintain order in the country", 
and "Fight rising prices". Of course, besides the specific limits of the model, here one should 
also point to the problem of how the relationship between values, action and social structure 
is examined through survey-based attitude studies. Unfortunately, there is no room for dealing 
with this topic here
4 Inglehart's original model (Inglehart 1977) is also partially flawed in that its definition of 
postmaterialism emphasizes the positive correlation between a low priority for economic well­
being and new attitudes and styles o f political participation, but it quickly dismisses the fact 
that the same low priority for economic well-being is also associated to an orthogonal factor 
which includes both the desire for "more beautiful cities and countryside" (this item was 
added in 1973 to the survey questionnaire, and it was meant to tap "aesthetic" needs; see 
Inglehart 1977:45) and personal safety needs. In fact, the item on "more beautiful cities and 
countryside", turns out: a) to be important only in relatively advanced countries, but at the 




























































































new (elite) groups demand wider representation for their own demands and the 
right to have "political say" within the polity. To take them as indicators of a 
general rise of qualitatively new values might mean mistaking the ideology 
through which new elite groups try to advocate access to political decision­
making from which they were previously excluded, for a wider social trend that 
is indeed not there.
In the NMC-based version, the best and most carefully drawn models in 
considering structural factors - as I shall say later on - are perhaps those of 
Touraine (1969) and Melucci (1984; 1989). But besides the many doubts that the 
conflict between the "technocratic planners" and the disempowered "new 
intellectuals" is a really central one (Lyon 1986), most of the other works take 
the existence of this conflict in a somewhat anecdotal fashion. They are not clear 
on whether the new demands express concerns derived from a substantive 
transformation in the reproductive structure of the social system, or whether they 
are, again, simply previously unrepresented ones asking for access to the polity. 
Often, the NMC's supposed interest in more democracy is just derived from 
surveys of attitudes rather than from structural analyses, thus making a rather 
weak case for "Postmaterialism", especially since the NMC appears to be just 
another elite segment, and its actual size does not in itself make it into a major 
socio-structural change.
In short, these models indicate above all the need for modernization of 
Western political systems face to the rise of new social and economic groupings 
(see eg., Kaase 1990) with new economic and political preferences. Yet, the 
structural nature of the changes and of the new cleavages, and the way they
impersonal, more humane society", and "A society where ideas count more than money", and 
negatively correlated with high priority for economic stability and political activism (Inglehart 
1977:45-50). What seems to emerge from this analysis, then, is that "postmaterialism" is an 
ambiguous phenomenon which, while it definitely taps a disregard for economic well-being, it 
also includes some "prematerialist", nostalgic desire for safer and less conflictual social 




























































































relate to the new political issues is hardly examined.5 Because of this, potentially 
relevant conclusions concerning the question of why these specific new demands 
(including mainly environmental ones) emerge are missed, and the emphasis is 
instead placed on the aspects related to political democratization.
In most analyses, the relationship between the structural position of the 
conflicting social groups, their "cultures", the demands that are advanced, and 
the forms of political action, is left unanalysed. The question is especially 
important for the environmental challenge, as it is normally held to represent the 
core of the "new politics", of the NSM, and of the postmaterialist quest. The 
relationship between the social-structural (and between the cultural-structural) 
level and the content of the new political demands is not really examined. For 
example, while it is plausible that increased education and security may produce 
demands that are less directly related to sheer economic well-being, the sense in 
which the new demands are "post materialistic" and concern the "quality of life" 
is never made too clear,6 as well as what these definitions mean at the structural 
level of social reproduction. Moreover, it is not clear why these demands should
5 For example, Dalton, Kuechler and Buerklin (1990:10-16) examine the main differences 
between the New and the Old movements in ideology and goals, the motivations to 
participate, the organizational structure of the new political groups, political style: all points 
that relate to the realm of political action The aspects related to the base of support is only 
shortly touched in a half page. On the other side, the socio-structural hypothesis was since the 
beginning quite difficult to substantiate through survey data: few survey data can relate the 
support for the environment to socio-structural factors, and evidence generally fail to support 
a "social class" hypothesis as based on income and occupational prestige, while only the 
education aspect turns out to be broadly associated with environmental concern. Besides this, 
only age, ideology and urban residence, are related to environmental concern (Van Liere and 
Dunlap 1980). Besides these difficulties, no explanation has been given of the only certain 
structural finding available, namely that working class people are not inclined to have 
postmaterialist values and to engage in "new politics" phenomena. The only explanation has 
been that working class people were already represented by traditional leftist and socialist 
parties. But this, again, does not answer the question of what is qualitatively new in the 
"postmaterialist" demands.
6 For example, in what sense is peace a life-style issue rather than one o f personal security, or 
why do these demands include environmental care but not the possibility of travelling faster, 





























































































include political openness, participation, democratization as a substantive value, 
and not just as a mere by-product of the fact of demanding access.
The New left roots of environmentalism have been seen precisely as 
consisting of demands for political modernization and democratization. But 
precisely because the link between environmentalism and political values has not 
been analysed carefully, attributing the rise of the greens to a Left-libertarian 
wave may mean overlooking some of the socio-stmctural transformations, as 
well as some of the empirical political phenomena, that have contributed to the 
political impact of the issue.
3. A restatement based on available evidence
In fact, there are first of all empirical evidences that there is more than 
postmaterialist cohorts and NMC segments underlying the political impact of 
modem environmentalism.
Eurobarometer surveys have been used to support the postmaterialist 
hypothesis but they have also tried to measure the concern of Western 
populations for environmental problems. And, these data have shown how, 
during the whole 1980s, the proportion of those declaring that environmental 
problems are "important" or "very important" has never dropped below 90% in 
any of the Western European countries, and has tended to rise across the decade 
(Hofrichter and Reif 1990). When the above data are matched to data about the 
diffusion of postmaterialist values, however, it is almost immediately obvious 
that, as reported by Inglehart (1990:93, table 2.4), in 1987 the proportion of the 
population holding postmaterialist values averaged 15% across the same EU 
countries (16% in the US) - with countries raging from 25% (Netherlands) to 6% 





























































































The two set of figures are actually so distant that one may well wonder 
whether they tap different phenomena. In front of them, one may start to wonder 
who are the post materialists whose presence should explain the rise of the new 
movements, and what has their role been. A first answer is Inglehart's finding 
that Postmaterialism is correlated with "membership or potential membership" in 
the ecology movement (Inglehart 1990b:53-56), but much less so with the more 
general category of "strong approval" (notice, not "indifference", or 
"opposition"!) of the movement itself. In fact, the proportion of those falling in 
the "member/potential member" category for the environmentalist movement 
according to Inglehart ranges (1986 data) from 8% (Belgium) to 50% (Greece), 
thus coming closer to the level of diffusion of postmaterialist values.
Few studies, however, have compared actual participants or activist, with 
people who more broadly "support" the movement or its cause. Two of these 
have been conducted by Kriesi (Kriesi 1989a; 1989b) who found that as one 
proceeds from non-supporters, to sympathisers, to potential participants, to 
participants and to activists in the environmental movement (in Holland), the 
proportion holding postmaterialist values in each subgroup increases 
progressively from 6 to about 40%, with the main gap occurring between 
"sympathisers" and "potential participants". And again, while the global 
proportion of those who define themselves as "activists" or "potential activists" 
in the environmentalist movement is close to the proportion of postmaterialist 
among the population, once the "supporters" are included one reaches 
percentages of 80-90%, which are closer therefore to the proportion of people 
who think the environment is an "important" or "very important" problem" 
(Rohrschneider 1991).
These data may indicate a split between actual members of environmentalist 
groups and the generally sympathetic population. The environmental 
phenomenon may thus be comprised of a group of post materialists more likely 




























































































instead more generally "concerned" about environmental decay and broadly 
"supporting" the movement's goals. A confirmation comes from a recent and still 
preliminary set of research findings by Witherspoon (Witherspoon 1994). Her 
study found "environmental pessimism", "romanticism", and "concern" to be 
positively correlated among themselves, but not with environmental (and 
scientific) knowledge. At the same time, however, the politically active green 
activists turned out to possess a higher level of scientific knowledge, to be less 
"romantic" about nature and a little less "pessimistic" about the environment.
The presence of more than one component behind the environmental 
phenomenon emerges also when one looks at patterns of active participation in 
environmental struggles. Since environmentalism first broke out in Europe with 
the anti-nuclear struggles, politically active participation on these issues was by 
no means limited to activism in the more or less official movement organizations. 
In Italy the anti-nuclear campaigns encompassed a strong grass-roots component 
from which they actually derived their main strength. This component was based 
on the mobilization of citizens living close to the sites where the nuclear plants 
had to be built. Protest demonstrations were mostly local ones, even if a degree 
of central coordination by movement organizations and activists let them achieve 
a unity of timing and effect, and allowed political demands to be translated at the 
central national level. In Germany, according to Mueller-Rommel, "Most of 
these movements emerged spontaneously on the local level as politically 
independent citizen-initiative groups. These groups were interested in single 
issues such as the provision of parks; they protested against urban renewal, new 
highways, or the construction of nuclear power plants." (1989:5; see also 
Mueller-Rommel 1985; Diani 1990; Scharf 1994). The same can be said of local 
environmental struggles in Britain, where a national movement cannot be said to 
exist (Lowe and Goyder 1983; Diani 1995), and in the US, where local citizen 
mobilizations against toxic waste facilities, for example, have become a major 



























































































conservation organizations (Masterson-Allen and Brown 1990; Perrolle 1993; 
Walsh, Warland and Smith 1993). In sum, a strong emphasis on local 
mobilizations has been a distinctive feature of contemporary ecology action 
almost everywhere the Green movement has been most successful at becoming a 
major national political actor. During the whole 1980s environmental 
mobilizations remained largely based on local and regional cases; the importance 
of these phenomena of local grass-roots resistance by no means being limited to 
the initial phase (Diani 1995).
The new environmental challenge, thus, encompasses a properly said 
environmentalist movement as well as the above forms of citizen resistance: "A 
constant feature of environmental mobilizations in Western countries has been 
the interaction between actors with moderate political orientations - often 
dwellers in areas confronting growing environmental risks... - and actors with 
more radical, anti-establishment attitudes - often formerly socialized to politics 
within post-1968 protest movements" (Diani 1995:ch. 1). Yet, although important 
in building political pressure and in making the issue more salient, these grass­
roots mobilizations (and their participants as well) have constituted a quite 
different aspect of environmentalism from the action of the main organizations 
"officially" representing the movement (Donati 1994). First, the activation and 
mobilization of citizens owed little to the major environmentalist organizations 
that are normally seen as constituting the movement. Second, most of these 
conflicts, and the grass-roots groups supporting them, remained very short-lived. 
Third, in many cases the mobilizers would disclaim the "patronage" of the main 
environmentalist associations, or they would refuse to recognise a leadership role 
to movement activists.
Most of the participants in these local grass-roots mobilizations are likely to 
be quite different from those who define themselves as "members" of the 
environmentalist movement or of the main environmentalist associations. 




























































































although they are concerned about environmental degradation, participants in 
local NIMBYs, resistance, or "technology" mobilizations are not likely to be 
defined - or even to define themselves - as environmentalist activists or even 
participants. Sheer economic motives and motives of personal security do not 
loom very far behind these actions: the fear for personal health due to chemical 
hazards is one aspect, but even more important is the preoccupation with the loss 
of value of estate assets, be they discovered to lie on a Superfund site, or just 
devalued by the nearby noise and pollution generated by a planned motorway, 
airport runaway, or landfill. Indeed, these people seem to have very little in 
common with Inglehart's young postmaterialist activists concerned with issues of 
democratization and self-realization. Citizens mobilising against local hazards or 
development plans share the anti-institutional positions of the environmentalist 
movement. But they tend to adopt rather defensive and particularistic justice 
frames stressing compenzation rights, rather than a universalistic frame stressing 
world salvation (Edelstein 1988; Masterson-Allen and Brown 1990; Feagin and 
Capek 1991; Aronson 1993; Capek 1993; Kowalewski and Porter 1993).
In fact, if activists and participants in the NSMs and their organizations have 
been said to belong typically to the NMC (ie., journalists, teachers, semi­
professionals and professionals in the medical services, social workers, 
journalists, etc.: Cotgrove and Duff 1980; see also Melucci 1984), when the 
analysis is broadened to the outer supporters and to the participants in local 
resistance mobilizations, other social strata tend to emerge, mainly belonging to 
the "old" middle class or the petite bourgeoisie. As Kriesi put it, the concept of 
NMC is at the same time too broad and too narrow here. Using data on the 
Netherlands he shows that not all members of the NMC actually participate or 
even support the NSM, but this support is restricted to the social and cultural 
specialists. At the same time (at least in the Netherlands), there seems to be a 
high degree of support of NSMs and the environmental demands among the 




























































































activities but mobilize occasionally when directly concerned; they do not hold 
postmaterialist values, but still tend to frame some of their concerns as 
environmental concerns, and are therefore eager to declare that they feel worried 
by environmental problems, and that they "support" the goals of the 
environmentalist movement. Similarly, Diani finds that, even compared at the 
local level, the main difference between mobilizers in grass-roots neighbourhood 
groups and the members of city and regional branches of the environmental 
movement’s organizations is one of education and occupation, with the former 
being significantly less likely to hold a university degree and a professional job. 
Consequently, only 15% among the former could be classified as members of the 
NMC, against 44% of the latter (Diani 1995). Concerning the US, finally
Unlike other contemporary movements (eg., the women’s 
movement, anti-nuclear groups) the movement against toxic waste is 
not composed primarily of highly educated or upper-middle-class 
people who are motivated by global concerns... [These local 
mobilizers]...are not highly educated, and are not young. Nor are 
they part of an alternative culture. (Masterson-Allen and Brown 
1990:487-97)
Thus, these findings raise some questions about the role of different segments 
of the middle class in the environmental issue and in other "postmaterialist" 
issues, and point to the need for a different and broader view of the 
environmental challenge. Rather than the spread of postmaterialist values, or of a 
demand for democratization of political processes, some of the aspects 
connected to the concern for environmental degradation seem to stem from 
rather basic feelings of anxiety. They can be seen as
the reflex of subtly disquieting perceptions which... contribute to 





























































































4. Modernization, rationalization and resistance
Early NSM theorists had recognised that environmental conflicts could be seen 
as the mobilization of a set of defensive concerns against technological 
modernization and rationalization. These analyses seem to be consistent with the 
idea that there is something like a "romantic-pessimistic" aspect of 
environmentalist protest. They might therefore provide the basis for an analysis 
of the environmental challenge as a result of specific structural processes, thus 
going beyond its interpretation as a simple phenomenon of conflict of interests or 
of political competition.
According to Habermas, for example, the new conflicts arise at the point of 
juncture between the rationality of the system and the culture of the "life-world" 
(Habermas 1981b). They are expressions of a retreatisin ("They do not seek to 
conquer new territory"; Habermas 1981 a:34) seeking to defend the values and 
traditions (the "grammar of forms of life") of civil society's enclaves (of the 
"periphery") against the "colonization" imposed by the "core" of the system: the 
pervasive process and profit-informed rationalization of the bureaucratic 
capitalist state and its apparatuses. Environmental struggles are seen as opposing 
the consumeristic redefinition of the life-world and of personal life styles 
(1981b). In a similar way, Alain Touraine (1978) sees the New Social 
Movements as a struggle between the technocratic apparatus and its "clients," 
defending the right to choose their own style of life. In his first works (Melucci 
1977, 1980) Melucci also saw the origin of the NSM in the need of 
contemporary apparatuses to extend their forms of control beyond the structure 
of production and into the reproduction of social relationships, into the areas of 
consumption and social services. As control over the labour force is no longer 
enough, the capitalist state expands its control to civil society's organizational 
structures, the exchange of information, symbolic systems and interpersonal 




























































































ability of central apparatuses to intervene on society and social life. Face to the 
increasing pressure of this impersonal but pervasive power, social conflicts shift 
from the factory and the political system to new spheres where the NSM struggle 
for the reappropriation of their personal identities against the rationalising 
intervention of technostructures. Castells (1983), finally, also argued that 
community-based mobilizations are triggered by the problem of the social 
control and manipulation of local space as a systematic feature of today's 
economic organization.
A number of works have recently echoed these views. Following Touraine, 
Luke claims that informational advancements and the internationalization of the 
economy displace material products and goods: choices and opinions are pre­
manufactured and pre-framed, and made of "consumerist individualism, material 
progress, anti-communism, mutual defense, and liberal-democratic decision­
making" (Luke 1989:136). The resistance to these transformations, while still ill- 
articulated, mixes up new and traditionalist characters, progressive and 
regressive populist overtones. Again, however, the lines of conflict are between 
"technocratically empowered planners/producers/providers and disempowered 
citizens/consumers/clients." (Luke, 1989:133) Luke sees a parallel between 
environmentalism and the tradition of community defense and populism (Luke 
1991; see also Lasch 1991), against the domination of "New Class's" 
technocracy. Feagin and Capek (1991) have emphasized that: "Such 
movements... are a strategic historical response to a particular kind of 
powerlessness, a pragmatic strategy in a complex, bureaucratized, monopoly­
capital context" (Feagin and Capek 1991:48-9).
A recent book by Jamison et al. (1990), using Habermas's category of 
"knowledge interest", has succeeded in penetrating some of the cultural- 
structural questions underlying the environmental quest. According to it, the 
"knowledge interests" which are specific of the new environmentalism find their 




























































































resulting technologization and bureaucratization of social life. The environmental 
issue is seen as a quest about the production and use of technical knowledge, 
both in social life and in political decision-making, and as one that "could only 
emerge at a time when the convergence between science and industry, as well as 
some unintended effects of industrialization, were becoming apparent." (Jamison 
et al. 1990:4). What is still missing from this analysis, however, is a structural 
examination of the logic - or "grammar" as Habermas says - of the social 
identities that underlie the environmental "knowledge interests". The question is 
how central are, and why, the values of equality, democracy, participation, to 
environmental issue's roots in the cultural criticism of technical rationality and 
bureaucracy; and whether there are other values that become more central for 
those strata who feel threatened by technology.
More in general, these analyses raise the question of the nature of the life- 
forms from which resistance originates. Habermas talks about the "grammar of 
life-forms", yet he never quite defines the basic articulation of such grammar 
besides speaking of "peripheral" forms of life as opposed to the system's "core". 
Other theorists basically claim that the new movements are "identity-centerd" 
(see Luke 1989) but hardly say anything about the content of these identities. For 
both Touraine and Habermas it is the identity-centerd character and the related 
anti-state focus that cause the political ambivalence of the NSM.
An empirical problem is that especially the Habermasian version ends up 
identifying the mobilising groups as marginal ones. But even if one considers 
resistance mobilizers at the local level, who are therefore not NMC members, 
there are strong doubts that these strata can be defined as "marginal" or 
"powerless". Furthermore, there is no mention of the problem of how petite- 
bourgeois life-forms (assuming that they are marginalized life-forms) can 
become allied with the progressive NMC struggling for openness and 




























































































between the latter and the supposedly regressive, neo-communitarian instances 
of the "peripheral" groups.
5. Dissolving traditional ties and the process of individualization
A deeper analysis of structural and cultural factors connected to the above 
identities, and to the "life-forms" is therefore needed.
In my opinion, there is one aspect whose structural implications and 
consequences have not been analysed enough in depth. As Kriesi (1989a) 
reminds us, the dissolution of traditional ties also entails as a specular condition 
the increase of individual autonomy. In a long essay on the NSM in West 
Germany, Kitschelt follows in part the original Habermasian and Tourainean 
analyses. Yet, his attempt to understand the NSM historically - that is, as 
movements that come after the great social conquests of the Old Left - brings 
him to look at the other side of the coin of the process of modernization and of 
its consequences for society's reproductive mechanisms. Kitschelt sees the NSM 
as "organized around the provision of intangible life chances" (1985:276). They 
seek autonomy from the state because: "The welfare state compromise is hostile 
to qualitative life chances." (Kitschelt 1985:277) Implicit in Kitschelt analysis is 
that the life chances are individual life chances. And indeed, he sees the conflict 
also as one between the imperatives of production and those of consumption, 
linked to the opposition between the sphere of production and the sphere of 
reproduction.
But perhaps the two authors who have analysed the process of 
individualization in its relationship to the rise of the NSM and the environmental 
struggles are Melucci and Beck. Melucci does not stress the separation between 
the neo-communitarian component and the NMC component. Rather, especially 
in his later works (eg., Melucci 1989) he sees the structural determinant of both 



























































































logic of individualization empowers the individual as a self-reflexive actor, but 
also forces state and bureaucratic apparatuses to extend their control - using the 
same self-reflexivity - to the symbolic sphere and into the territory of individual 
life. The logic of individualization, therefore, is the logic of both life chances and 
the defense of one's own identity.
Ulrich Beck has also pointed to the logic of individualization as determining 
new patterns of conflict. His work clarifies some of the systemic origins of 
individualization.
18
In the welfare state of the West, reflexive modernization dissolves 
the traditional parameters of industrial society: class culture and 
consciousness, gender and family roles. It dissolves these forms of 
the conscience collective, on which depend and to which refer the 
social and political organizations and institutions in industrial 
society. These detraditionalizations happen in a social surge o f 
individualization... The tendency is towards the emergence of 
individualized forms and conditions of existence, which compel 
people... to make themselves the center of their own planning and 
conduct of life... we increasingly confront the phenomenon of a 
capitalism without classes, but with individualized social inequality 
and all the related social and political problems. (Beck 1992a:87-8)
Beck's model is similar to that of Melucci. The idea is that there is, first, an 
increase in the resources that are available to the individual as resources for 
individual action and choice, and second, an increasing disposition of individuals 
to perceive themselves as individuals (reflexivity). At the origin of the process 
stands the disappearance of traditional social and community ties, coupled with 
the universalization of the labour market and of the educational process, and 
with the rising standards of living.
Melucci and Beck work can help defining the structural determinants of the 
NSM and the environmental conflict, although the two authors tend to draw two 
rather different conclusions. Melucci (1989) argues that the "new" movements 




























































































rather with the production of meaning which presides to the "administrative 
logic" of the system. The system is challenged on the "codes" of domination, and 
the first groups to mobilize will be those who are directly touched by the 
production of meaning. According to Beck, the distribution of risks in 
contemporary societies breaks the patterns of class and pits citizens against the 
very institutions (science above all) that are supposed to be in charge of risk 
prevention.7 A "commonality of anxiety" (instead of a commonality of need) 
emerges together with "solidarity from anxiety". This gives rise to conflicts 
where people are touched in their property, health, chances of work 
achievement. These conflicts are "oriented to the grass-roots, lion-parliamentary, 
not tied to any particular class or party, and programmatically diffuse or even 
fragmented." (Beck 1992b: 117)
The two pictures, once again, seem to evoke the dualism between the core of 
the NSM and the local citizens' mobilizations. Yet, when taken together in their 
common emphasis of individualization as the central mechanism that spurs new 
controversies, they seem to provide a useful conceptualization for the identity 
forms that a number of central strata in Western societies are trying to articulate 
through new controversies (the NSM) such as the environmental one.
Thus, if Habermas identified the new social movements as focusing over the 
"grammar of forms of life", but used the term in a generic way, Melucci - whose 
concept of "codes" (dominant vs. alternative: Melucci 1984, 1989) is akin to that 
of "grammar" - provides a useful hypothesis about the specific grammar from 
which the challenge arises: It is the grammar of individualization that stands at 
the origin both of the progressive struggle over the life chances animated by the 
NMC, and of the straggles for the defense of life-forms from rationalization. The 
claim, however, still needs a proper structural foundation explaining how the 
process may work.





























































































6. The middle-class society
The historical process leading to the formation of the "social state" is said to be 
linked to the diffusion of a "grammar" of life-forms based on individualization 
(Kitschelt 1985). The process in which civil, political and social rights become 
universally recognised and institutionalized is a process that ultimately 
formalizes the individual as the legitimate center of society (Melucci 1989). It is 
somewhat ironical, therefore, that while it is aimed at improving life-chances for 
increasingly larger strata this process (which is also inscribed within the social- 
democratic project of the modem organized working class; see Sulkunen 1992) 
ends up defeating this same purpose.
The process is first of all a process of formation of new middle-class strata, 
and it is due to several parallel social and political transformations that take 
place slightly before the development of environmental protests and of the NSM. 
The social state represents a primary factor in the development of an 
"intermediate" service class (Esping-Andersen 1993), as well as a powerful 
interference in the reproduction of the traditional classes through the competitive 
labour market (Offe 1985b), as it creates groups of workers whose (class) 
position is unrelated to the strict capitalistic process. This is part of the attempt 
to "defuse" the "revolutionary bomb" of industrial conflict (Dahrendorf 1959) by 
providing universal citizenship rights and by creating new "intermediate" 
interests between the proletarian class and the bourgeoisie. Other related 
transformations are represented by an increase in social mobility (even if 
confined to adjacent class positions); a general decrease of the differences in 




























































































strata (due also to the successful struggles of organized labour);8 a progressive 
growth in the global average income of families; a rise in general education 
levels (Sylos-Labini 1986). These processes are related to a number of more 
specific transformations in the organization of work and of social reproduction. 
The main ones are: the enormous growth of the number of people employed in 
circulation and distribution, management, administration, due to the increased 
complexity of knowledge, and consequently of management and steering needs,9 
compared to the needs of physical production (Bell 1973); a general 
"reorganization of capitalism", itself related to the decline of employment in 
industrial (and agricultural) production that makes available human resources for 
new tasks;10 the growth of the sphere of reproduction (medicine, social work, 
education, etc.), of personal services and of the culture industry, all with their 
middle-class professionals and small entrepreneurs, in turn made possible by the 
increased well-being of families and individual consumers; the welfare-state's 
white-collar employees and administrators, that may be seen as related both to 
the need to tame the class conflict, and to the need to absorb unemployment 
(Offe 1985b; Sylos-Labini 1986).
The result of these changes has been the rise of a number of professional 
careers, categories, and groups that have filled-in industrial society's cleavage 
between the working class and the capitalist (and managerial) class (Sylos- 
Labini 1986; Esping-Andersen 1993). The importance of the working class itself, 
in numerical terms, has progressively decreased. The debate on the meaning of
8 Although some have argued for a reversed process, where the growth of education brought 
to an increased offer of intellectual work, thus causing its relative depreciation compared to 
manual work (Sylos-Labini 1986:149)
9 Which includes the advent of the "managerial revolution", and of "technocracy" (Dahrendorf 
1959; Galbraith 1967). For an original thesis, see Lash and Urry (1987).
10 This includes both the idea that there is an increadsed need for supervision due to the 
decline of other forms of social control, which brings about the "professional-managerial 
class" (Wright 1978; Ehrenreich and Ehrenreich 1979; Abercrombie and Urry 1983); and the 
idea that capital needs to consume the accumulated surplus and to create a spending capacity 
that keeps the economy running, both of which are satisfied by the creation of new "non­



























































































these transformations has raged for years in relation to the "proletarianization" 
thesis.11 Yet, even Marxist students (eg., Offe 1985b; Lash and Urry 1987) have 
recently recognised that this trend has brought about an increasing fragmentation 
and complexity in occupational structure.
Post-industrial society seems to produce much less 
proletarianization than did its industrial predecessor... it appears that 
unskilled service workers' share may stabilize around a maximum of 
10-15 percent of the labor force; this compares to roughly 20-25 
percent unskilled industrial workers in 1960." (Esping-Andersen 
1993:45)
It is possible to say, then, that Western societies are experiencing the 
disappearance of a well-defined structural cleavage in the productive relation, as 
if the new occupations, and the productive structure that is linked to it, tend to 
eliminate deeply polarized structures (Offe 1985b). Post-industrial society is less 
polarized and its cleavages "are numerically less substantial than their industrial 
forebears." (Esping-Andersen 1993:48) But this is also related to a decrease in 
the differences - in income, culture and life-style - among the various social 
groups in the lower- and middle-classes.
The middle class comes now to represent the largest part of the population, 
thus constituting a "thick" middle layer. Yet, precisely because this debate has 
brought students to focus on the aspects related to production on one side, and 
on the "objective" conditions of people's (and middle class strata's) lives (which 
has been true even for Weberian students), they have almost completely 
overlooked the cultural aspects related to the perception of social reality on the 
side of these same strata, and the consequences this may have on the formation 
of identities.





























































































7. Individualization and consumption
Yet, there is one more question; that is, how do the new "intermediate" class 
positions translate into the new individualized identities and into the 
individualization of the "grammar of life-forms"? The answer is: Thanks to the 
growing centrality of consumption.
It is a common understanding that in the period between the end of the 1950s 
and the 1970s the Western world has reached the stage of mass consumption. 
Statistical figures indicate that in the period from 1960 to 1990, for example, the 
share of food in household expenditures went down from over one half to 
slightly more (sometimes less) than one quarter; at the same time, the ownership 
of cars and TV sets increased by a factor of five to ten.12 13*
Today we stand at the climax of the society of consumption: the so-called 
"postmodernist" stage.15 Even more than on occupational structure, the parallel 
processes of fragmentation and de-differentiation may be said to have produced 
their effects at the level of culture and life-style. Processes of fragmentation and 
middle-classization are based on, and increase the, prospects for individual 
mobility across an increasingly homogenous social space and across a set of 
similar but different occupations and styles of life, access to which, moreover, 
compels the individual to compete with other individuals. In people's subjective 
experience, thus, the structure of stratification comes to resemble a thick stratum 
of "closely packed layers" (McKendrick et al. 1982). There is certainly more 
competition and an increased perception of the risks connected to the separation 
from traditional support networks, but also a sense of increased democracy, 
equality and freedom, where the subjects may experience "formerly exclusive
12 See Therborn (1995) for an useful summary of these figures.
13 This seems to be true regardless o f whether we assume, like Baudrillard (1974), Bell (1976) 
or Jameson (1984) that contemporary society has moved into a new stage in which
consumption (and culture) play an unprecedented role, or if we assume that it is the culture of




























































































types of consumption and styles of living" (Beck 1992a:95). Individuals are 
brought to experience an increased room for individualized choice and for 
individually chosen experiences and identities.
Consumption is not a postmodern phenomenon. Yet, the social sciences have 
paid very little attention to its development as an activity of social reproduction 
(Douglas and Isherwood 1979; McCracken 1990; Sassatelli 1995). Some 
conclusions, however, may be drawn from the work of social historians and 
anthropologists who have traced the vagaries of consumption and style since the 
eighteenth century (McKendrick et al. 1982; McCracken 1990). These works 
tend to stress one point which may turn out to be very important: namely, that 
the rise of consumerism and of a culture of consumption to the foreground of 
social life, is typically related to the expansion of middle-class strata.
McKendrick has shown (McKendrick et al. 1982) how the first expansion of 
consumption that took place in eighteenth-century England was pushed by a 
process of social equalization and by the rise of middle-class strata. These strata 
created newly expanding markets for goods, and came to constitute the motor of 
imitation and fashions. The preconditions for the boom were represented by 
rising wages for workers, a social structure characterised by a "narrowing social 
distance", and by high opportunities for social mobility. Documents of the period 
(around 1760 and 1780) talk of a "spirit of equality", "emulation", and 
"ambition" to raise oneself at the level of those in superior ranks, and of the idea 
that "society was an aggregation of self-interested individuals tied to one another 
by the tenuous bonds of envy, exploitation and competition." (Mckendrick et al. 
1982:18)
That consumption is used for status competition is a sort of truism. The accent 
here, however, is not on the phenomenon in itself, but rather on the existence of 
historical cycles that may represent structural patterns. If the social-structural 
characteristics that accompany periods of booming consumption remain 




























































































hypothesised that the individual freedom deriving from the fall of more 
traditional boundaries increases competition for status among individuals and 
groups (Beck 1992a). All ages of breakdown of traditional social structures and 
systems of stratification, in which individuals are freed from social ties, are 
therefore phases in which consumption activities become particularly intense.
Another important point is that consumption is not just a game of imitation. 
The attention to consumption styles, but even in the sphere of work the 
professionalization of careers through the multiplication of degrees, diplomas, 
professional groups, etc., are also part of a game of "distinction" (Bourdieu 
1979), and this is a very central mechanism in the self-reproduction of 
consumption practices. Social groups lose their identities; they become open to 
choice (Melucci 1989), but also open to expropriation and symbolic occupation. 
In place of patterns of stratification determined by tradition, there is a continuous 
destitution and re-constitution of social boundaries. Strategies of symbolic 
"closure" (Parkin 1979) are used to establish differences both in the sphere of 
consumption (eg., imitation and "exclusivity" in styles) and within the labour 
market (eg., formal boundaries among professions). Following Bourdieu one 
may say therefore that the middle classes are the classes whose "habitus" is 
characterized by the search for distinction, precisely because they are the classes 
that historically have felt the need to justify and symbolize an existence that 
otherwise would have been "lost in the middle". Middle-class society is a de­
differentiated society in which the struggle for status achievement is continuous:
[The] social-structural position [of the new and old middle classes] 
makes their members perfect consumers, who have to fight for status 
on the diverse markets. (Eder 1993:146)
On the one side,
The forms of existence that arise are the isolated mass market... and 




























































































articles of daily use, as well as opinions, habits, attitudes and 
lifestyles launched and adopted through the mass media. (Beck 
1992a: 132)
On the other side it is precisely the mass standardization that multiplies the 
strategies of individualization based on symbolic closure. Where boundaries 
become thin and blurred, efforts to draw them are more intense (and they are 
likely to be more frustrating). This game of distinction - or of "building bridges 
and fences" (Douglas and Isherwood 1979) - therefore is strictly related to the 
development of the middle-classes, and represents the basis of individualized 
life-styles and of the "grammar" of individualization.
This does not mean that social relationships today have become symbolic, in 
contrast with their previous "materiality". Neither it means that the symbolic 
aspect of goods and behaviours was absent before. Class and status-group 
relationships have always had a symbolic content (that ultimately has to do with 
the legitimation of social structure itself). Today, however, the symbolic 
potential is unleashed by the processes that bring to individualization and to the 
erosion of traditional boundaries. In contrast to other historical periods of 
booming consumption, today the middle-classes have come to represent the 
largest part of the population in all advanced societies. As a consequence, the 
sphere of consumption, as opposed to that of production, becomes the central 
sphere for the reproduction of social structure and of society qua society.
Some have noticed that with the increase in material wealth, consumption 
patterns turn towards the intellectual, recreational and abstract. Inglehart’s theory 
of Postmaterialism may be seen as a variant of this thesis. But this is not the 
point. The point is that every area of life (including arts, DiMaggio 1987; urban 




























































































and more areas become part of markets and the goods and objects that belong to 
them become "consumable".14
There is the need, therefore, to abandon the perspective that sees social 
groups as carriers of "new" values, and to focus instead on social groups as 
"producers, transmitters and consumers of... culture." (Betz 1992:97) Such a 
perspective can show how, in a society that becomes "self-reflexive" (Melucci 
1989; Giddens 1990; Beck 1992a) conflicts become increasingly centered, as 
Kitschelt (1985) says, on the structure of social reproduction. In fact, the 
grammar of individualization, by infusing the identities of individuals and social 
groups, becomes part of the structure of production and reproduction of society. 
The "new" conflicts, and the environmental challenge among them, are rooted in 
this "structural" process.
8. The politics of consumer society: Freedom, de-classification, and anxiety
Consumer choice is a central mechanism through which a "grammar” of 
individualization develops because it is the carrier of an experience of self- 
assertion and freedom. Through it, freedom becomes freedom of choice (for all: 
Bauman 1988). Critics in the Marxist tradition like Marcuse and the Frankfurt 
school have noticed this, but they have seen consumer freedom as simply 
another (superstructural) way for capitalism to dominate the masses (Bauman 
1992). They have tended to see it under the perspective of "commodification" of 
culture and politics.15 Clearly, capitalism does have an interest in expanding
14 As to cultural goods: "changes in social structure and the rise o f an open market for 
cultural goods have weakened institutionalized cultural authority, set off spirals of cultural 
inflation, and created more differentiated, less hierarchical, less universal, and less 
symbolically potent systems of cultural classification than those in place during the first part of 
this century." (DiMaggio 1991:134)
15 In this perspective, individualistic attitudes that hamper political action become proper of 
working class individuals who reach a certain level of income and who live in certain cultural 




























































































consumption (Jameson 1984), and it is important not to overlook this aspect. 
Nevertheless, the focus should be put here, as Featherstone says "on the question 
of the growing prominence of the culture of consumption and not merely regard 
consumption as derived unproblematically from production." (1991:13).
In this sense, the experience of freedom of choice is no doubt a correlate of 
the erosion of traditional norms, social ties and boundaries. But the growing 
importance of the sphere of consumption is not only an effect that stands for a 
phenomenon of equalization and democratization of living standards. It is also a 
phenomenon through which the individualized grammar of life-styles is given 
substance, reinforced, and ritually confirmed as a central normative pattern for 
all those who participate in it. Consumption, therefore, becomes one of the 
fundamental activities through which the social and nonnative structures are 
reproduced.
A study on the culture of white-collar workers in Italy (Donati and Grazioli 
1992) showed that especially those workers who had reached a white-collar 
position coming from a working class background, perceived the 1980s as a 
decade of "realization of a full-fledged democratic society". And this perception 
was rationalized by means of continuous reference both to the sphere of the 
labour market and to that of consumption. In fact, both spheres had undergone 
an important expansion in Italy in the late 1970s to early 1980s. In the sphere of 
the labour market, the processes of restructuration of many large firms, brought 
about an explosion of personnel searches for white-collar jobs (especially for 
sales-related professions), which allowed many lower strata the move to a 
recognizable and recognized "middle-class" position. This, in turn, brought about 
a whole new set of classifications and categorizations of careers and professions, 
together with the idea of an unprecedented equalization and freedom of choice. 
In the sphere of consumption, even aside from the rise and equalization of living 
standards, the early 1980s were marked by a sudden burst of advertising and 




























































































1980, advertising investments on the TV medium, which had had a very limited 
increase (or no increase at all) during the previous decade, suddenly doubled and 
kept doubling every two years until 1984 (Masi 1989; Marletti 1993). The main 
consequence was that the whole population was submitted to a bombardment of 
messages relating the increased capacity of spending that many middle- and 
working-class strata had achieved during the 1970s, with a compelling 
illustration of the many different outlets for this spending capacity. The available 
quantity of goods was thus linked to the idea of choosing styles and identities, 
and the endless panoply of commercial ads (and of personnel advertisements) 
ritually confirmed that Italy had become a new society, where democracy and 
freedom were at last realized.
Similar conclusions concerning the political significance of consumer 
sovereignty and of freedom ofchoice may be drawn from those studies which 
have examined the rising role of fashion in the 1970s and 1980s (Davis 1992), or 
the new forms and vocabularies of advertising (Schudson 1984; Comu 1985), as 
well as from the conclusions that have been drawn by students of the so-called 
"enterprise culture". According to Abercrombie (1991) and Schwengel (1991) 
for example, the shift from the authority of producers to the choice of consumers 
that is implicit in the so-called "post-Fordist" revolution (Piore and Sabel 1984) 
implies a diffusion of authority and a form of pluralism that represents a 
challenge to the distinction between "high" and "low" culture (see also 
DiMaggio 1987; Featherstone 1991) and to the legitimacy of traditional 
institutions. A theory of commodification - argues Abercrombie - would miss the 
point here, because it would see consumers as deprived of consciousness instead 
of seeing them as making(political) choices. The shift, thus is a process of 
acquisition of cultural citizenship by consumers and by middle-class people that 
develops in continuity from the political struggles of the 1960s, although it goes 
much beyond the latter. Far from bringing to political annihilation, the spread of 




























































































based on a "grammar" of individualization - has specific and important 
consequences for political behavior and conflict.16
When die analysis shift from civil society to the sphere of politics, one may 
then see the New Social Movements as expressing the entrance into it of 
"consumer-culture politics", precisely as a cultural form, rather than as an 
aggregate on new "postmaterial" values or interests. Abercrombie and Urry 
(1983) have noticed that the development of the new middle-class groups has 
generated new forms of politics. These are represented by a fragmentation of 
social groups advancing claims to rights, basically generating system crises and 
inflation. Fragmentation,
will be a consistently significant feature of such politics. The 
struggles of labour are... transformed by, first, being removed from 
the center of the historical stage; secondly, having the service class 
as their apparent 'main enemy' over numbers of issues; and thirdly, 
through sections of that service class developing alternative political 
forms which 'out-radicalize' labour (feminist and ecological politics 
are the best example). (Abercrombie and Urry 1983:151)
Bauman (1988:ch.5) pointed out that the problem of consumer freedom is that it 
tends to expand to other fields of social life: the areas of production, 
government, community, national politics. New movements arise against all 
forms of bureaucratic control asking for freedom from bureaucratized and 
centrally controlled policy areas.
Once government provides... public goods... attention turns to more 
specific goods... the public is differentiated and begins to request, 
for example, specific kinds of educational aid... not just support for 
education itself. (Benjamin 1980:28)
16 It is to be noticed that my preoccupation is not with the consequences of individualization 
for the individual psyche. I think this aspect of the spread of consumer culture, which has 
been analyzed for example by Warde (1994) is not the key point My interest is for the 
consequences of consumer culture for the individuals as social agents, whose behaviors and 




























































































And of course, the public institutions and the state are ill equipped to respond to 
this sort of conflicts and to such a request for flexibility. For these institutions, 
and particularly for the welfare state apparatuses, flexibility is a critical point 
because the culture of services is one derived from producers' culture; ie., a 
culture of the production, rather than of the consumption or use of services (Keat 
and Abercrombie 1991). As Offe (1990) says, no conventional mode of political 
intervention such as legal regulation, taxation, subsidies, or even state- 
promulgated and subsidized education and information, can succeed in 
responding to problems in areas such as health practices, nutrition, gender and 
family relations, environmental consumption, and the ethical codes of technical, 
scientific, and professional groups. Offe therefore locates the main cause of 
these movements (and especially of the green movement) in the "poverty of 
public policy"; that is, in its structural inability to respond to problems of 
identity, shared meanings, integrity of moral life-world experiences, etc.
This offers a hint into the political role of consumption practices. A 
structurally informed analysis of the rise of "postmodernist" politics has been 
recently offered by Betz (1992). Betz argues that it is possible to examine the 
culture of the New Middle Class as a meaning-producing construct, rather than 
as made of new (postmaterialist) values. Using the German case, Betz argues 
that segments of the German middle class, and specifically the young "cultural 
specialists" have been the carriers of a postmodernist attitude confronting 
dominant political forms with a political stance based on a cult of individualism 
and subjectivity, including cynicism and escapism but also forms of pseudo­
mysticism and a "new sensibility", among which especially relevant is the 
concern for the environment. These stances, he argues, are "promoted and 
sustained by the alternative culture and by segments of the Greens" (Betz 
1992:107) and can be read as a conflict based on a strategy of "de-classification" 
(Bourdieu 1979; DiMaggio 1987; Featherstone 1991) against dominant social 



























































































Seen from this perspective, the rise of postmodernism in West 
Germany... lends empirical as well as theoretical support to 
Featherstone's attempt to interpret postmodern culture in terms of an 
attack by outsider intellectuals on the existing system of 
classification with the goal of reconstituting the symbolic order in its 
own favor. (Betz 1992:108)
People in this class segment score high on postmaterialist scales not because 
their material needs have been satisfied, but because they are trying to displace 
the logic of the institutionalized political game, and because they are interested 
not so much in consuming more of the same, but rather in consuming differently: 
in "de-classifying and re-classifying" consumption (and therefore social and 
political) practices.17 The struggle, therefore, must not be read in terms of 
political interests, but rather in terms of identity and legitimation of one's social 
and political role.
These groups are represented by those segments of the NMC active in the 
new movements' organizations and who share a postmaterialist value-system 
(see also Lash and Urry 1987). They are the carriers of a demand for political 
openness as the theory of the New Politics has claimed. However, while it 
borrows from the language of the Left-libertarian tradition, their culture is only 
partially one of democratization. Their stance is more populist (in the sense also 
in which Jameson, 1984, defines postmodernism as aesthetic populism) and aims 
not so much at democratizing state institutions, but rather at relocating politics 
within (or closer to) civil society; within (or closer to) the market and 
consumption practices.18
17 As Featherstone says: "The new cultural intermediaries, do not seek to promote a single
lifestyle, but rather to cater for and expand the range of styles and lifestyles available to 
audiences and consumers." (1991:26) "The new tastemakers encourage an inflation in
cultural goods." (1991:35)
18 Despite the fact that some critics have signalled how this strategy of "de-classification and 
re-classification" often advances the subjective-expressive values of nature through an 
ideology of rigid and authoritarian "eco-scientism" (Alphandery et al. 1992), this stance seems 




























































































But the logic of individualization is by no means restricted to this segment, as 
I already pointed out in the previous chapter. This is rather a general logic that 
pervades all middle class culture and it is not necessarily a progressive culture. It 
can as well lead to defensive stances, for example against technological and 
institutionalized risk (Beck 1992b). In fact, the culture of consumption and 
individualization pervades all middle-class strata, but not all of them belong to 
the groups of NMC's "cultural specialists" that are able to follow an upward 
social trajectory.
The second component is that of grass-roots populism. This component is also 
pushed by a grammar of individualization. Its segments, however, are less likely 
than the NMC segments to be successfiil in transforming their cultural capital in 
economic capital. They will typically embrace the politics of consumption, but 
they will soon find themselves trapped in their own individualistic politics. They 
will seek freedom from the state (for example through demands for less 
bureaucracy, less taxes and more privatization) and invest in consumption as a 
form of symbolic struggle, but at the same time they will be hit by the very 
specific problems that a culture of consumer choice will tend to create: physical 
overcrowding and symbolic loss of meaning.
One of the problems is that an accelerated rate of consumption (which is of 
course actively pushed by industries) tends to create problems of physical 
overcrowding, congestion, and coordination (Wickham 1976) that are 
particularly relevant as environmental problems. Yet, because Gershuny 
(1978:ch.3) has countered the thesis of the "social limits to growth" (Hirsch 
1976) it is worth discussing it shortly here. Gershuny has argued that even if 
growth brings congestion from material goods this will be a net loss for rich 
people, but still a gain for the poor who can increase the material goods they 
own and command. Moreover, according to Gershuny, rather than being an 
inherent limit, congestion is a problem of coordination which may instead be 




























































































influenced, in its practical consequences, by those structures that make social 
coordination (and cooperation) possible However, coordination structures tend 
to pose another problem: They are typical public goods, and will hardly be 
provided through individual action or the market. On the contrary, solving 
coordination problems depends on complex patterns of information exchange 
among the parties (Elster 1989), and it is quite likely that these will be seriously 
hampered by the process of individualization and de-classification as it causes a 
second type of problem: the loss of meaning.
In fact, both Hirsch and Gershuny fail to incorporate the symbolic value of 
consumption within the problem of positional goods; ie., the idea that congestion 
is also related to status competition This is a problem of cooperation, rather than 
of coordination. Coordination would solve the problem of physical 
overcrowding, but not that of symbolic devalorization due to increased access to 
a class of goods. It is here that the core of the problem of positionality lies 
(Featherstone 1991). The middle class, as 1 said above, is typically drawn into 
the game of consumption as distinction, and this game implies a continuous 
altemance of de-classification and re-classification strategies. But the problem of 
drawing boundaries tends to reproduce itself precisely because it is increasingly 
difficult to draw such boundaries after traditional culture has been eroded. 
Occupational levels are divided by thin differences, and ascension and status are 
less and less related to "objective” merit and performance.19 This creates a 
situation of "loss of meaning" that makes symbolic congestion more frustrating 
and unsolvable than physical congestion may be. The symbols of status become
more contestable than ever before... [as] such symbolisms are
perishable goods (Sulkunen 1992:19-20).
19 Notice that contrary to Bell's (1973) assumption, a system based on objective meritocracy 




























































































In absence of an ability to legitimize them by connecting them to some cultural 
tradition, symbols become mere simulacra (Baudrillard 1974, Featherstone 
1991). The typical instrumentalism that derives from pervasive closure and 
competition means a devaluation of symbols, of myths and of culture itself as an 
established network of meaning: a situation of erosion of social capital.
This causes the problem, for individuals, of building identities and 
orientations from materials whose meanings are unstable.20 Intersubjectivity 
becomes infected by doubt (Wemick 1991). Society faces a deficit of trust that 
hampers collective solutions and traps these people into a "prisoner's dilemma". 
Precisely where coordination would be needed, the culture of individualism and 
its strategies of consumption-as-closure prevent individuals and groups from 
solving the problems of cooperation, and leave them in a no-exit situation.
It is in this second side of the problem that anxiety is rooted. The feeling of 
anxiety about one's social position that middle classes experience are rooted in 
the fact that these segments feel at the same time free and constrained. This 
mechanism spurs protests that emerge when congestion and frustration reach the 
highest levels. Risk and accident issues are a typical case here, as accidents 
represent coordination failures that threaten individual freedom, property, and 
security. Yet, because people are enmeshed in a culture of individualism, these 
protests tend to draw on local-community identities and networks as a point of 
aggregation,21 and to see large public institutions and bureaucracies, as well as 
big firms, as the "non-cooperating" enemies and strangers.
However, these protests are not part of an identitarian quest. Rather, they will 
typically show a mixture of populism and a particularistic form of distrust.
20 In other words, I tend to support Hirschman's thesis concerning the inherent dissatisfaction 
generated by consumption and possession as they are thought to alter, or conversely to fail to 
alter, the social hierarchy (Hirschman, 1982:ch.3).
21 At the same time as individualization claims autonomy from all types o f established 
collective institutions, it cannot avoid to make collective mobilization more problematic on a 
wider-than-local basis, thus forcing social movement organizations to devote an increasing 




























































































Demands will swing back and forward between the request that big 
bureaucracies and organizations submit themselves to the control and the will of 
"the (local) people", and the idea that they should help controlling the behavior 
of big organizations, like the firms. A typical tendency will also be that of asking 
for the regulation of others but not of oneself, like in waste-siting protests. Also, 
these protests (often local ones) are likely to emerge when material growth slows 
down (Brand 1990), as this creates more anxiety and suggests pessimistic 
attitudes concerning one's chances of success at the social game. Thus, these 
demands will not represent a concent for nature arising from the mystique of 
subjectivism and expressivism, like for NMC segments. Environmental concerns 
here will rather stem from more material and selfish worries with one's own 
status and material well-being.
In the end, as Offe states, these grass-roots movements do not carry any 
utopia or project for the future. Rather, they may be characterized as "Fear, pain, 
and (physical or symbolic) destntction vs. integrity, recognition and respect". 
"The 'enemy' which is to be overcome is no social class or category of people, 
but some more abstract kind of rationality in which, at least to some extent, 'all 
of us' do partake or upon which we depend." (Offe 1990:234). Once again, the 
anxiety expressed by these forms of protests will hardly be geared towards the 
defense of some traditional values or culture per sc. Most likely, it will also not 
be geared towards political access (namely, it will be politically noncommitted), 
but rather towards a generic definition of freedom from risks; which is at the 
same time the freedom of choice and the freedom from the constraints caused by 
others' behaviors. Thus, it is true that these movements mainly represent a revolt 
of civil society against the state, as in Habennas account. However, the 
contradictions from which they arise are located in civil society itself, rather than 
at the juncture "between system and life-world".22
22 Thus, the fact that the state becomes the focus of new conflicts, does not mean that the 




























































































9. Insecurity, reciprocal trust, and the problem of collective institutions
Part of the problem in interpreting the environmental challenge and the NSM, as 
I have tried to show, was derived from the failure to distinguish their different 
constitutive layers explaining the relationship between their structural location, 
their cultural orientations, and their forms of political action, therefore 
reconnecting them to one cultural-structural matrix. Here, I have defined a 
hypothesis seeing the NSM challenge as arising from the individualized logic of 
a consumption-oriented culture and society, and from the combination of 
strategies and concerns of different middle-class segments. The fact that these 
arise from the very same logic of individualization, but from different sides of it, 
explains why the two components of ihe environmental conflicts show frequent 
ambiguities in their reciprocal relationship (for example with grass-roots citizens 
often being distrustfiil of the "official" movement organizations, and with the 
militants of the latter being not so ready to spend their time in organizing the 
local protests in a more structured rank-and-file membership (Donati 1994).
My interpretation of the content of the environmental challenge, for example, 
is not very different from Jamison et al.'s (1990) definition of the 
environmentalist "knowledge interests". Yet, if the structural positions from 
which these "knowledge interests" arise are not examined, it is difficult to 
explain why they sometimes take the form of a positive challenge to existing 
institutions, and why in other cases they resemble defensive and retreatist 
outburst of "pessimistic communitarianism". It is for example difficult to explain 
why, in spite of the fact that it is the "technological knowledge interests" that 
represent the core of the environmentalist identity (Jamison et al. 1990), the
Instead, the state is one element that participates of the structural processes of production, 
and above all o f reproduction, o f contemporary Western societies in whose changing patterns 



























































































main quest is addressed to political institutions, while industry is only marginally 
challenged in a direct way.
The environmental challenge is - perhaps more definitely so than any other 
issue related to the NSM - the issue of a middle-class society. But the problem 
cannot be defied in traditional class terms. Rather, it is one concerning the 
structure of culture. Here perhaps Eder (see esp. Eder 1993:ch.5) has given the 
best formulation of the question by saying that the environmental challenge does 
not represent the outcome of a class conflict; it represents the outcome of the 
entrance of middle-class cultural dispositions (Eder sometimes uses Bourdieu's 
concept of habitus here) in politics.
There is barely need for new empirical evidence to support the conclusion that 
environmental problems - as political problems - are linked to the rise of the 
middle classes. The cycle of the environmental challenge is consistent with the 
broad economic cycle that goes from the expansion of the 1960s and 1970s 
(with some countries like Sweden, the US and Britain coming earlier; see 
Edsforth 1987; Sulkunen 1992; Therbom 1995) to the social crisis and economic 
recession of the 1980s. The passage between the 1970s and the 1980s, which 
coincides with the antinuclear struggles, is thus not surprisingly a point of 
juncture. The 1980s have still been a period of sustained success for 
environmentalist instances and organizations. But the phenomenon was indeed 
marked by some changes. From a narrow NMC-based phenomenon, it 
developed into a major cultural shift, as it is witnessed by the growing worries 
that opinion pollsters kept registering throughout the decade, and by the local 
unrest of grass-roots mobilizers.
One can therefore hypothesize that while the 1970s were a phase in which the 
"progressive" component, based on the New left heritage of anti-bureaucratism 
and liberalism, prevailed, in the 1980s the "defensive" component took center 
stage, making the environmental challenge harsher and more visible. Thus, the 




























































































social capital. During the 1980s, the two components mixed and interlocked, so 
that environmental conflicts could be read as an expression of both a democratic 
struggle and an anxiety-driven populism. They came to encompass both the 
image that postmaterialist and the New Politics theorists have given of it, and 
Offe's (1990), or Brand's (1990) images of environmentalism and the NSM as 
outcomes of a "civilization crisis", an "anti-modem-tinged" critique of 
technology, rationalism, bureaucracy. Here again, it may be noticed that the 
pattern fits perfectly the model of "cyclical modernization crises" that express 
petite bourgeoisie’s anxiety toward the fall of certainties and traditional values, 
laid down by Brand (1990). Only, the modem environmental challenge has a 
quantitatively different size as, unlike in previous occurrences, the middle-class 
and the related consumerist phenomena have become the central phenomena in 
Western societies.
The issue of the "positional value" of goods, and of their related symbolic 
value, is central here. Goods have a symbolic value in all societies (Douglas and 
Isherwood 1979); however, in societies in which the "grammar" of 
individualization comes to pervade all (or most) institutions, this symbolic value 
also becomes an increasingly important part of the definition of (individual) 
needs. But this, in turn, means that the same logic through which society satisfies 
these needs "creates scarcity where it did not exist before." (Redclift 1990:56) It 
is in this sense, rather than in the sense of generic postmaterialist values, that the 
environment is a problem of life-style. It is a problem of life-chances defined as 
individualized life-chances (Kitschelt 1985).
In sum, my interpretation points to structural factors that are not, broadly 
speaking, economic-material factors like in Marxist theory. Nor, are they 
represented by the kind of "cultural values and attitudes" that traditional models 
(like Inglehart's) have used as explanatory variables. In my model, structural 
factors are meant as institutional factors in the sense that they represent 




























































































institutions) constraints to (the logic of) actors' actions. In this sense, the logic of 
individualization that I tried to sketch above, is the institutional component 
which underlies both sides of the environmental challenge and their relationship 
to both current political-institutional and social-institutional patterns. In fact, as 
an institutional component, it brings environmental problems, and the ensuing 
environmental challenge, right back to where they belong: into the realm of 
questions that concern institutional forms and the provision and maintenance of 
social structure as a public good.
The paradox here is that underlying the environmental challenge there is not a 
lesser, but a greater investment in material consumption. And this is so because 
consumption practices depend in a substantial manner on collective institutions 
for their coordination (see Wickham 1976): on social quality, and therefore on 
"soft", non-material, aspects. Furthermore, underlying the environmental 
challenge there is hardly the defense of the public good but rather an attack on 
the public good as it had been socially conceived so far; a criticism according to 
which the institutions that were supposed to work for the good of all, hamper 
instead the achievement of individual wealth and living standards. It is because 
of this that the intervention of public institutions is seen as creating even more 
problems:
The increase in collective goods... creates a bandwagon effect. The 
individual citizen is driven to government, including the courts, 
either to counteract the local park board's new scheme to enlarge 
the park, which has the incidental effect of reducing his front yard, 
or to try to get the park board to adopt a different scheme 
(Benjamin 1980:28).
The "postmodernist" strategy of de-classification puts especially the Old Left 
under attack when the latter is unable (like in Italy for example) to abandon its 
orientation (especially ideological) to the traditional working-class subject, and 




























































































1990:229). Once feelings of insecurity and anxiety set in, furthermore, local 
mobilizers and their "NIMBY" movements inherit the generalized lack of trust in 
social and political institutions that had developed in the previous phase. In this 
sense, societies pervaded by a "grammar" of individualization have been brought 
about also with the active contribution of traditional leftist organizations (parties 
and unions) as groups which have seen in production the ultimate goal of 
societies and political systems, and have therefore found obvious advantages in 
the promotion of a society of consumers and of a culture of consumption as 
forms that allowed a further expansion of the productive sectors.
That "The most obvious feature of... pollution problems is that they concern 
issues that are public goods" (Weale 1992:5) is not a new conclusion. Indeed, 
the whole discussion on "the tragedy of the commons" focused since the 
beginning on environmental problems (Hardin 1968), and the fact that the 
environmental challenge centers on issues that emphasize the problem of the 
collective good goes much beyond the fact that the "objective" problems concern 
such "public goods" as air, water, etc. It also does not mean that the effects of 
pollution are the same for every social group or individual (Beck 1992b). Rather, 
the environmental challenge stems from problems concerning the collective good 
as a social (and political) problem and not only as an "objective" problem. 
Much beyond Daniel Bell's idea that post-industrial society would be a 
"communal society" in which "such public interest issues as health, education 
and the environment... crime, municipal services, and costs" (Bell 1973:164) rise 
at the center of politics. I tend to share Habermas's (1973) point that the crisis of 
Western capitalism lies in the inability of modem institutions to produce 
legitimation as a public good.
Much beyond air and water pollution, the environmental challenge stems from 
issues that are directly related to problems of cooperation and coordination, like 
sewage, traffic, waste, but also from issues that are indirectly related to such 




























































































political choices concerning types of production technologies, and are also 
choices about the physical distribution of goods and bads (Beck 1992a; 
1992b).»
In this sense, environmental problems seem to epitomize the full range of 
issues that characterize "post-industrial" societies as societies in which a 
"grammar" of individualization becomes the central life-form. In a sense, it is 
possible to say, also, that environmentalism becomes a metaphor of the need to 
care for the collective good as the basic institutions and trust that should govern 
social life in a society of individuals. Now, it is trues that periods of de- 
classification and deconstruction of social ties and boundaries are cyclical and 
that sooner or later new patterns become institutionalized Yet, in our times the 
spread of individualization seems to be unprecedented. If this is the case, as 
Ostrom (1990) shows, no centralized authority or intervention will offer a viable 
solution. The challenge is rather that of reconstructing a culture of trust that 
would not deny the value of an individualized life form, and it is at the same time 
able to assume the existence of the collective good as a potential problem.
»  The problem of risk is indeed that of establishing legitimate social priorities rather than a 
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